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IN TBE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EUGENE P. CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No. 15912

vs.
PEARL STAGG,
Defendant and
Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for personal injuries
sustained in an automobile accident.

Defendant claims that

the parties had reached an accord and satisfaction prior to
trial.

Plaintiff contends the release was void or voidable

because of the mutual mistake of the parties.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court, sitting without a jury, found that the
defendant's negligence was the sole and proximate cause of
the accident giving rise to plaintiff's injuries and that
the plaintiff was not negligent.

The court thereupon awarded

money judgment with interest and costs to the plaintiff.
The court found that the release agreement entered into
between the plaintiff and the defendant was voidable by the
plaintiff on the basis of mutual mistake relating to the
conditions that prevailed at the time the agreement was
executed.
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The court determined further that State Farm Mutual
Insurance Company was not a necessary party to the action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the trial court's judgment
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant has selectively extracted and set forth
facts from the record as if they were the only facts adduced
at trial.

The plaintiff does not consider as proper the

defendant's use of editorial license in failing to account
for all the salient facts germane to the trial court's
decision.

The eristical nature of the defendant's statement

of facts tends to confuse and distort the factual foundation
relied upon by the trial court in rendering its decision.
The accident giving rise to this litigation occurred on
September 9, 1973, approximately two miles west of Price on

u.s.

Highway 50-6 when the defendant turned her vehicle in

front of the plaintiff's vehicle causing the collision in
which the plaintiff sustained injuries and property damage.

(R. 1-2).
While still at the accident scene, the plaintiff
noticed lumps beginning to form on his knee, right wrist and
right elbow.

(R. 122).

At about the same time the plaintiff

began to experience pain in his neck.

(R. 122).

The plaintiff

was then transported by the police officer to Carbon Hospital
where he was examined by Dr. Gorishek who ordered x-rays and
performed a clinical examination upon the plaintiff.

(R. 23).
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Dr. Gorishek reached a diagnosis of cervical strain (Ex.
39), and accordingly prescribed a muscle relaxant and pain
reliever.

( R. 17).

It was the doctor's opinion, on September 9, 1973, that
the injury was minor and that it would best be treated by
conservative care relying on the natural body functions to
heal the injury.

(R. 17-18).

The doctor testified that he

thought the condition would be cured within a month or two
and that he had no reason, at that time, to suspect a herniated disc at the C-5, C-6 level.

(R. 18, 59).

The plaintiff then left the emergency room, with the
impression that he was not seriously hurt.

(R. 123).

Accordingly, the plaintiff arranged for substitute transportation that evening and returned to work the following
day.

(R. 123).
Mr. Campbell telephoned Mr. Lavell Brown, the State

Farm adjustor on September 12, 1973, to make arrangements
for transportation during the interim period while he was
without a vehicle. (R. 125).

During that phone conversation,

Mr. Brown asked if Mr. Campbell had received any injuries in
the accident and Mr. Campbell replied, "Well, no, I've had
x-rays at the Hospital and on my neck, my right arm, up in
the shoulder and down to the elbow, or below the elbow is
sore, and my left wrist is a little sore and I had a little
bump on my knee.

That's about all."

(Ex. 23, P• 3).

On the basis of that conversation Mr. Brown concluded
that Mr. Campbell had only a minor injury (T. 67) and thereupon
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reported to his superiors that the injuries received by Mr.
Campbell consisted of only "multiple bruises."
2 4,

(T. 68, Ex.

2 5) •

Mr. Campbell went to see Dr. Gorishek again on September
19, 1973.

The doctor noted that his condition was "still

about the same:
(T. 18).

soreness in his neck, mostly on the left."

The doctor stated that he did not change his

diagnosis or have any reason to suspect any additional
injury than that observed on September 9, 1973.

{T. 18).

Accordingly, in response to Mr. Campbell's inquiry as to the
seriousness of his injuries, the doctor stated that the
healing "would take a little time, maybe a month or two."
(T. 125).

The doctor then attempted to alleviate some of

the discomfort during that time by prescribing a cervical
collar.

(Ex. 3, T. 45, 46, 124).

The doctor summarized his

perception by stating that he knew Mr. Campbell had an
injury to his neck, but at that time thought it was a minor
strain.
( T.

The exact nature of the injury was unknown to him.

60).

Two days after his visit to Dr. Gorishek on September
21, 1973, Mr. Campbell met with Mr. Brown, the State Farm
adjustor.

Mr. Campbell stated that at that time he relied

on Dr. Gorishek's representations that his injuries were not
serious and that he was going to get better in a month or
two.

( T. 126).

In the course of the negotiations, Mr·

Brown stated that the company would pay $850.00 for the
damage to the car, $400.00 for pain, suffering and injury
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and would give an open ended medical and lost wage settlement with a specified upper limit.
release that evening.

Mr. Campbell signed the

(T. 75-84).

Mr. Brown stated that at the time of the settlement
that Mr. Campbell advised him that he was okay other than a
slight pain in the neck.

(T. 76).

The parties decided on an open release form as compared
to a set amount form because both parties knew that Mr.
Campbell was still seeing the doctor and that complete
healing of the injury, according to Dr. Gorishek, would
take one to two months.

(R. 524, T. 76, 77).

Both Mr. Brown and Mr. Campbell indicated that their
settlement was based on the existence of a minor injury that
would be cured within a relatively short time.
126, 127, 76, 77).

(T. 101,

The doctor's report obtained by Mr.

Brown from Dr. Gorishek (Ex. 52) on September 28, 1977, led
Mr. Brown to conclude that there would be no permanent
physical impairment.

(T. 82-83).

Mr. Campbell visited Dr. Gorishek again on September
26, 1973, because he was beginning to experience more discomfort in his neck.

(T. 129).

The doctor felt no need to

change his diagnosis at this time.

The doctor prescribed

another cervical collar and injected xylocaine and cortisone
to relieve some of the muscle strain and soreness in his
neck.

(Ex. 3, T. 19 , 45 , 46) •

The doctor at that time felt

that Mr. Campbell's pain and discomfort was caused by arthritis aggravated by trauma.

(T. 47-8).
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The doctor saw Mr. Campbell again on October 30, 1973,
and concluded that the findings were still about the same.
( T. 20).
On November 13, 1973, Mr. Campbell's condition had
significantly deteriorated as evidenced by his complaints of
soreness in the arm.

(T. 49).

The doctor continued treat-

ment with mild sedation for pain.

(T. 20).

I t was at this

time that Dr. Gorishek suggested that Mr. Campbell be
examined by Dr. Robert H. Lamb, an orthopedic surgeon.

(T.

20).
Dr. Lamb saw Mr. Campbell on November 30, 1973, in the
Carbon Hospital.

(T. 129).

Dr. Lamb concluded after the

examination that arrangements should be made to admit Mr.
Campbell to St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City.

(T. 21).

On December 7, 1973, before Mr. Campbell's admission to St.
Mark's Hospital, Dr. Lamb sent a letter to Dr. Gorishek
indicating his diagnosis of nerve root pressure in the
cervical spine.

(T. 50).

Mr. Campbell was admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital on
December 19, 1973, for what he thought to be an exploratory
examination.

(T. 129).

While at St. Mark's, Mr. Campbell

was observed by Dr. Dennis Thoen, a neurologist.

(T. 177).

After conducting a neurological examination which included
an electromyography, Dr. Thoen concluded on December 21,
1973, that Mr. Campbell "was suffering from a herniated
cervical disc with compression of nerve roots C-5, possibly
C-6."

(T. 179).

The doctor continued conservative treatment
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and released Mr. Campbell from the hospital on January 4,

(T. 130).

1974.

On February 14, 1974, Mr. Campbell, by letter, notified
Mrs. Stagg through her agent, State Farm Muta! Insurance
Company of his decision to rescind the settlement agreement
and accordingly tendered a cashier's check in the amount of
$1,250.00 representing an estimate of the amount of money
paid by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company pursuant to the
release agreement.

(T. 170, Ex. 34).

Contemporaneously with the recission and tender made by
Mr. Campbell and subsequent thereto, State Farm paid Mr.
Campbell and his creditors for medical expenses and lost
wages.

(Ex.

68).

The payments made by State Farm were

made directly to Mr. Campbell and his creditors and were not
made through Mr. Campbell's attorney.

(Ex. 68).

All payments

made thereafter by State Farm were made knowing that Mr.
Campbell intended to rescind the agreement.
The plaintiff's complaint was then served on the defendant
on February 24, 1974.
March 15, 1974.

(R. 1-4).

The defendant answered on

(R. 5-8).

From January 4, 1974, through the last of August, 1974,
Mr. Campbell's condition worsened and became in his words,
"unbearable."

(T. 132).

He experienced extreme pain in his

arms, head, neck and shoulders.

(T. 130-2).

The doctors

concluded that he should be hospitalized for further evaluation
and treatment.

Mr. Campbell was readmitted to St. Mark's

Hospital on September 4, 1974, and was re-examined by Dr.
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Thoen who conducted another electromyogram.

(T. 180).

The

doctor concluded from his examination that "there had been
no improvement in his C-6 radiculopathy" and that "his EMG
was unchanged."

(T. 180).

The doctor recommended disectomy

and fusion as the only reasonable means of relieving Mr.
Campbell's symptoms. (T.181).

The operation was unsuccessful

from a technical standpoint, and Mr. Campbell's condition
continued to deteriorate.

(T. 134, 135, 182).

Dr. Thoen saw Mr. Campbell again in May of 1977 and
from the examination concluded that Mr. Campbell had "a
thoracic outlet syndrome, that is the irritation of the
nerve bundle that runs from the neck down into the arm."
(T.184).

Dr. Thoen contrasted his diagnosis with Dr. Gorishek's

diagnosis of cervical strain as follows:

(T. 190).

Q.

Could the herniated disc itself, could
the fact or the truth of a herniated disc,
together with the fact or the truth of
brachial plexus syndrom or thoraic
outlet syndrome be masked or hidden behind
the general symptoms of a cervical strain?

A.

• • • I'd say that any herniated disc,
thoracic outlet syndrome that may result
from a hyper extension injury would initially
present itself as a cervical strain and would
be almost impossible to distinguish one from
the other unless one were a neurologist and
examined the patient. Neurology may do it
but even the average orthopedist I think would
have great difficulty doing so.

Dr. Thoen concluded that • • • "Dr. Gorishek may

have known the patient had the numbness [in his hands] but
may have been unaware of the significance of the numbness. •
(T.190).
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The case was set for trial on October 3, 1977, at which
time the plaintiff tendered $4,124.58 plus interest in the
amount of $1,332.70 to the defendant pursuant to U.C.A. 7827-1 and 3.

(R. 104).

The defendant, on the first day of the first trial and
after the case had been pending for over three years, informed
the court that the case could not proceed to trial until the
proper parties were named.

The Court denied the motion.

(Minute Entry dated October 3, 1977, found seven pages after
R. 536).

Judge Sheya sat without a jury on the first trial

and then took the matter under advisement.

He subsequently

passed away before he rendered his decision, and the action
was then transferred to Judge Bennell who reset it for trial
on February 23, 1978.

The only other reference to an objec-

tion on the basis of failure to join an indispensable party
appears in the form of an "Objection to Trial" which was
submitted by the defendant on January 18, 1978, approximately 30 days before the second trial.

(R. 220).

By the

rules of the court, the motion was not scheduled for hearing
until the date of trial at which time the court denied the
defendant's motion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
STATE FRAM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY IS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE
PARTY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE RELEASE BETWEEN
APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT.
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A.

The respondent did not enter into a release agreement

with the appellant's insurance company and, therefore, the company
has no independent standing as a party in this action.
The appellant's argument that State Farm is an indispensable
party in this action is indeed enigmatic.

The argument is

premised on the allegation that the respondent entered into
a release contract with appellant and with appellant's
insurance company.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 15).

It is with

this premise that the respondent first takes issue.
The language of the release agreement is fully set out
in the Record.

( R.

7}.

In essence, the agreement requires Mr. Campbell to
release all persons from any claims, demands, etc. arising
from the accident in question in return for the consideration
outlined in the agreement.

This peculiar drafting of the

release agreement requires a litigant to sort through all
the legal entities that could be referred to in the release
to garner the real parties to the contract. The respondent
is unable to understand the rationale underlying the
appellant's argument that of all possible parties named in
the release, the insurance company should not only be joined
but joined as an indispensable party.

At the time of the

execution of the release, possible claims existed against
the manufacturer and servicer of defendant's auto which
allegedly experienced brake malfunction, the state department
of transportation who maintained the highway and certain
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medical persons, who treated the plaintiff.

When the

complaint was filed, did all these parties who were unnamed
in the complaint have a right to be manditorily joined as
indispensible parties?

Of course not.

The plaintiff's

choice of defendants precluded them from any possible liability and thus from any legitimate right to be involved in
this litigation.
The respondent fails to see how the appellant's position
for mandatory joinder of the insurance company is even as
well-founded as a motion to join other possible defendants
to this action on the same theory.

As compared to the other

possible defendants, Mr. Campbell had acquired no cause of
action against the insurance company as a result of the
accident.

The fact that the accident produced no direct

liability on the part of the insurance company is a clear
illustration of the rationale demonstrating the company's
dispensability in this action.

The appellant, undaunted,

realizing that she is precluded from demonstrating the
vulnerability of the insurance company as a defendant on the
basis of liability, now attempts to procure the status of a
defendant for the company by use of 1) the execution of the
release agreement or

2) the existence of the insurance

contract signed with Mrs. Stagg.
As to the first area, the execution of the release, it
must be conceded that the insurance company cannot acquire
liability or interest in this action by Mr. Campbell's
release of the insurance company in the agreement.

If the
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insurance company had no liability before the signing of the
agreement, it had none after.

If that were not true, the

whole world would become necessary parties to this action
simply on the basis of their inclusion as a group in the
release.
Following from that premise, the release of the insurance
company becomes a nullity because Mr. Campbell had no cause
of action against the company to release.

It has long been

held that the surrender of or forebearance to assert an
invalid claim or defense will not constitute consideration
for a contract.

Huberdeau v. Desmarais, 79 Wash. 2d 432,

486 P.2d 1074 (1971); 17 Am. Jr. Contracts, §111.

Aside

from the release of the non-existant liability, the only
other consideration supporting the release agreement is the
money paid by the insurance company pursuant to the insurance
contract between the company and Mrs. Stagg.
It cannot be denied that State Farm was obligated to
Mrs. Stagg by its insurance contract to both defend and pay
the claims asserted against her.

The insurance company's

agent admitted that he negotiated the agreement for and on
behalf of the Staggs by reason of his agency with the
insurance company.

(T. 74).

The insurance company cannot

now claim that the money paid on behalf of Mrs. Stagg is to
be interpreted as the consideration supporting the company's
independent right to become a party to this action.

It is

an elementary principal of law that an agreement to do or
the doing of that which a person is already bound to do does
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not constitute sufficient consideration for a new promise.
·
Van Tassell v. Lewis, 118 Utah 356, 222 P.2d 350 (1950);
Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah, 1974); Apperson v.
Security State Bank, 215 Kan. 724, 528 P.2d 1211 (1974).
The insurance company is involved here only because it
is an indemnitor of Mrs. Stagg, and the Company, outside of
that relationship, has no cognizable right or interest in
this litigation. The money was paid by the company because
of an independent contractual obligation which cannot by
itself, support the insurance company's own independent
standing as a party to the contract.
As set out above, the insurance company is an indemnitor
and the right of an indemnitor or a party affected by the
possible outcome of litigation does not extend to being joined
as an indispensable party.
§149.

See cases at 59 Am. Jur. Parties,

The respondent has failed both to find a case where

an insurance company was joined as an indispensable party in
this type of case or even a case where a similar motion was
made.

The closest analogy seems to be the line of cases

where the insurance company moved to intervene as opposed to
being joined as an indispensable party under Federal Rule
24(a) (2) which is almost exactly identical to U.R.C.P.
24( a) ( 2).
Kelly v. Pascal System, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 755 (D.C.
Ky., 1960), was a case in which the insurance company was
denied the right to intervene in an action brought against
its insured, in order to determine whether it might rely on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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certain defenses in the insurance policy to any claim made
against it by the defendant insured.

The Court stated that

under Federal Rule 24(a) (2), "a party is bound by the judgment
only when he may be subject to a plea of res judicata," and
that, consequently, the insurer had no right to intervene
under the rule.

It added that the liability of the insurance

company was "only potential and may never arise even though
the liability of the insured is fixed in this action."
Kelly, supra at 778.

See also Slusarski v. United States Lines

Co., 28 FRD 338 (D.C. Pa., 1961); Lesser v. West Albany Warehouses, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 461, 191 N.Y.S. 2d 113 (1959); 84
ALR 2d 14l(c), 1414, §34[b]; 44 Am.Jur. 2d Insurance, §1526.
State Farm would be subject to all these attacks if it had
moved to join.

It would be ironical if the company, in this

action, could gain indirectly that which it could not obtain
directly.
Another line of analogous cases reveals that a third
party does not become indispensable to an action to terminate
a contract simply because its rights under an entirely
separate contract will be seriously affected by the termination.

Midland National Bank v. Cousins Properties, Inc.,

69 FRD 42 (N.D. Ga., 1975).

Likewise, State Farm does not

have an interest in this litigation because of its interests
in an insurance contract with Mrs. Stagg.

Moore, in his

commentary states that:
Although the setting aside of a lease would
make impossible the performance of a contract
between the lessee and another, it was held
-14-
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that the thir~ ~erson was only a proper party
and.co~ld be J~l~ed or not at the option of the
pla1nt1ff.
[c1t1ng cases]. Similarly, in a suit
by A to declare its obligations under a contract
with B as terminated, C, whose obligations to
B under another contract and who will be affected
by the status of A's obligations is not an
indispensable party
[citing cas~s].
3A

Moore's Federal Practice §19.10.

See also 59 Am.Jur.

Parties, §149, to the effect that the indemnitor must seek
intervention and that even then the right to intervene has
been denied an indemnitor.
The appellant's brief is premised entirely on the
existence of a contract of release.

It seems axiomatic

that if the contract of release fails, the theories of the
appellant in this regard likewise must fail.
B.

State Farm's actual representation in this case obviates

any claim of indispensability.
The facts of the case clearly illustrate that State
Farm's interests have been represented throughout this
action.

It was admitted at the first trial of this matter

that Mrs. Stagg has, at all times, been represented by Ray
H. Ivie who is the attorney for State Farm in the Central
Utah area.

It was also admitted that Mr. Ivie has been

retained by State Farm to represent Mrs. Stagg and that his
bill for defending Mrs. Stagg in this action has or will be
paid by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company.

(Supplemental

Record pp. 1-4).
Finally, the respondent took the deposition of Mr.
Lavell Brown, the state Farm Mutual Insurance Company's
representative, and the respondent's theory concerning the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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case should have been readily apparent to the insurance
company from the questions propounded to Mr. Brown. (T. 7577).
Despite these facts, State Farm has made no effort to
enter this action by the means available under Rule 24 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

It seems only logical

that if the insurance company, an experienced litigator,
thought that it's interests were inadequately represented
by Mr. Ivie, the company should have sought intervention
with other counsel.

Instead, the appellant, as if in

pursuit of a deliberate plan to invite the Court into error,
has allowed the case to go to trial twice without effectually
raising the defense until the first day of each trial.

The

appellant by such action, has undeniably created the circumstances comprising what she conceives as error and yet
complains of the results.

Such a trial tactic ought not to

be countenanced by the Court.
It would be incongruous if the insurance company could,
by its manipulations, get two bites out of the cherry.
First it sets up a strawrnan in the form of itself by claiming
through its insured that it is a necessary party, which, had
it really so believed, it could have been resolved by a
timely motion to intervene.

It is obvious that the company

intended to invite the court into error so that if it lost
on liability or d amages,

l.t

would have a basis for appeal.

It is inconceivable that Mrs. Stagg dreamed up this legal

-16-
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conundrum unbeknown to State Farm.
fore,

This procedure, there-

is close to a fraud upon the court.
C.

The two trial court judges properly determined that

appellant's insurance company was not an indispensable party
to this action.
The appellant, informed the court on the first day of
trial and after the case had been pending for over three
years, that she thought State Farm was an indispensable
party. The Court denied the Motion.

(Minute Entry dated

October 3, 1977, found seven pages after R. 536).
The appellant, then, approximately 30 days before the
second trial, submitted an "Objection to Trial" to Judge
Bunnell which was based on the failure to join an indispensable
party.

(R. 220). This motion was not noticed for hearing by

the attorney for appellant and therefore, was not heard
until trial.

Rules 4 and 5 of the Seventh Judicial District.

Rule 12(h) U.R.C.P. states that when the defense of
failure to join an indispensable party is made at trial, the
motion is to be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) "in
light of any evidence that may have been received."

The

procedure employed by the appellant in making the motion was
tantamount to presenting the motion on the first day of
trial because of appellant's failure to notice the motion
for hearing prior to trial.
Rule 15(b) u.R.C.P., independent of Rule 12(h), requires
that issues not raised by the pleadings be determined on the
-17-
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basis of the evidence presented.

The record in this case

reveals that no evidence was introduced before the trial
court by the appellant substantiating State Farm's
indispensability nor does the appellant suggest any evidence
that went to that issue.

In fact, the trial court, as part

of its findings of fact, concluded that State Farm was not
an indispensable or necessary party to the action.

(R.

527).
The Court in Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v.
Sugarhouse Shopping Center, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975), dealt
with a similar case and stated the following:
The trial court properly refused to dismiss
the action when defendants asserted, for
the first time, the defense of failure to
join an indispensable party, at the trial
on the merits.
Under Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P.,
when this defense is asserted at trial, it
shall be disposed of as provided in Rule
15(b), in the light of any evidence that may
have been received. At the trial, defendants
did not adduce evidence sufficient to establish
and identify an interest on the part of the
alleged "indispensable party," so as to
require joinder under Rule 19(a), U.R.C.P.
Papanikolas, supra, at 1258.
It is important to recognize that the only conceivable
interest of the insurance company in this case stems from
the execution of the release agreement.

Yet the issue of

the release was raised in this case by the appellant in the
form of an affirmative defense.

(R. 91-94).

Having plead

the execution of the release as an affirmative defense, the
appellant thereby assumes the burden of bringing forth the
evidence and establishing its validity.

66 Am.Jur. Release
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§45.

The respondent's case does not necessitate the

appearance of State Farm as a separately named party.

It is

the appellant's plea of the affirmative defense that is
responsible for what the appellant claims will jeopardize
the insurance company's interest. Certainly, the duty of
adding and dropping parties as it becomes apparent that the
defendant will rely at trial on a deed, contract, promissory
note or other document does not rest on the plaintiff, but
instead, rests on the party infusing the new issue into the
case.
The appellant essentially admits these arguments.

The

appellant uses a quotation from Houser v. Smith, 19 Utah
150, 56 P. 683, 685 (1899), which states:
Courts have no right to dispose of and adjudicate
upon property rights of persons not parties
to the case and strangers to the record, and
a judgment rendered against persons not parties
to the action, and over whom the court acquired
no jurisdiction, is absolutely void as to them.
(Appellant's Brief, P. 17).

The appellant characterizes the

case as standing for the proposition that if the court
adjudicates the property rights of persons not parties and
strangers to the record, they are not bound by the judgment.
The question then arises that if the adjudication of the
court in this matter is, according to the appellant's
argument, not binding on the insurance company because they
are not parties and are strangers to the record, where is
the merit in appellant's argument that the company's interests
are jeopardized and thus the company is indispensable.
-19-

The
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appellant must either contend that the insurance

company

is a stranger to this action and thus unaffected by it or
admit that it is represented in some fashion and thus
assume the burden to intervene if it feels the representation
is inadequate.
The respondent does not seek judgment against State
Farm, nor does the respondent rely on a judgment that is
binding on State Farm to execute against Mrs. Stagg and,
therefore, any issues of indemnity between State Farm and
Mrs. Stagg are totally separable from the issues involved
between the present parties in this action and can be separately determined. Shields v. Barrow, 17 H. 411 (1854);
(Appellant's Brief pp. 16-17).
The only authentic reason advocated by the appellant
for State Farm's joinder is the need to bind the insurance
company to the judgment in order to allow Mrs. Stagg to seek
indemnification from the company for any loss.
Since the appellant's argument is generated by Mrs.
Stagg's concern that she be indemnified, Rule 14 U.R.C.P.
provides the proper remedy. It states:
At any time after commencement of the action
a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff,
may cause a summons and complaint to be served
upon a person not a party to the action who is
or may be liable to him for all or part of .
the plaintiff's claim against him.
(Emphasis added)
The burden is cast on the appellant, under this rule, to
bring the insurance company, as an indemnitor, into the
action.

After all, it is only in the capacity of an indemnitor
-20-
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that State Farm has any interest at all in this action.
Since the respondent does not require judgment against
the insurance company to execute against Mrs. Stagg and
since the appellant contends that any judgment is void as to
the insurance company, Houser, supra and Appellant's Brief,
p. 16-17, then it follows that Mrs. Stagg is the only person
who needs or wants to bind State Farm to any judgment.
This concern of the appellant is beyond any conceivable
duty of the plaintiff to remedy.
D.

An insurance company should not be joined in a suit

involving both tort and contract.
The Court in Armijo v. Ward Transport, 302 P.2d 517
(Colo. 1956) dealt with an action for injuries received
in an automobile-truck collision in which the plaintiffs
not only joined the truck owner and driver as defendants but
also the truck owner's insurer and its adjuster.

The district

court sustained the insurer's and its adjuster's motions to
dismiss the action as to them.
The Supreme Court held that the parties who were dismissed
"were not essential or necessary parties to a proper adjudication of the claims of the plaintiffs."
518.

Armijo, supra, at

The Court reasoned as follows:
Plaintiff's counsel attempt to do by
indirection that which they cannot do
directly. we have held that in an or~inary
action for damages the insurance carrier
cannot be joined in the suit. Crowley
v. Hardman Bros., 122 Colo, 489, 223
P.2d 1045; Wheat v. Fidelity & Cas. C~.,
128 Colo, 236, 261 P. 2d 493.
Such being.
the law in this state the insurance carrier
cannot be made a party defendant to the
action for damages and to set aside.a release
when it was not named as a release in the
instrument.
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Arimjo, supra at 518.
The Court relied on Ferris v. Atlantic, 194 N.C. 653,
140 S.E. 607 where the Court distinguished cases that
alleged a conspiracy on the part of the insurance company,
its agents and other defendants involving fraud.

The Court

held that absent a complaint of fraud, the plaintiff had no
right to have the insurance company or its agents joined.
Arimjo, supra at 519.
The only case cited by the appellant is Pattison v. Highway
Insurance Underwriters, 278

s.w.

2d 207 (Tex. 1954).

In

that case, the plaintiffs alleged that the insurance company
through its agents had falsely and fraudulently misrepresented
the coverage of the insurance contract and had thus induced
the plaintiffs into a settlement agreement.
at 209.

Pattison, supra

The Court stated the general rules as follows:
The policy of insurance here involved is
written on a standard Texas automobile
insurance form.
It is now well settled
that a suit by an injured person against
the insurance company before he has obtained
final judgment against the insured is
prematurely brought; and it is further well
settled that a suit by the injured person
against the insurer in the same suit in which
he attempts to fix the liability of the
insured is abatable. Seaton v. Pickens,
Tex.Com. App., 126 Tex. 271, 87 S.W.2d 709,
106 A.L.R. 512; Bluth v. Neeson, 127 Tex.
462, 94 S.W.2d 407; Bransford v. Pageway
Coaches 129 Tex. 327, 104 S.W.2d 471.
It
is ordi~arily reversible error in a sui~ t~
recover for personal injuries for a plaintiff
to get before the jury inf~rmation that th:
defendant is protected by insurance. Barrington
v. Duncan, 140 Tex. 510, 169 S.W.2d 462.

Pattison, supra at 210.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-22-

The Court, followed the rule previously set out that
since fraudulent conduct was alleged, the insurance company
was a proper party to the action.

There are no allegations

in the present case of fraud or misconduct on the part of
the defendant or her insurance company and, therefore, the
insurance company has no right to be joined.
The Court in Christensen v. Peterson, 483 P.2d 447
(Utah 1971), held that an insurer could not be properly
joined as a party defendant with a tort-feasor.

See also,

Young v. Barney, 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873 (1965);
Holt v. Bell, 392 P.2d 361 (Okl., 1964).
The Utah Court in Christensen, supra endorsed the
holding of Lloyds' of London v. Blair, 262 F.2d 211 (C.A.
10, 1958) where the Court observed that the plaintiff had
improperly joined two causes of action.

"One sounded in

tort, and no contractual right or liability was involved.
The other was against a group of insurance carriers; the
liability asserted was solely and exclusively contractual.
No liability in the nature of a tort committed by the
insurance company was involved."

Christensen, supra at 448.

The Court held:
• • • The two causes of action were separate
and distinct with entirely different bases
in law. No single party defendant was liable
both as a tort feasor and as contractual obligee
for the payment of compensation under an insurance agreement. And the issues as between
plaintiffs and the United States o~ one hand,
and as between plaintiffs and the 1ns~ranc7
carriers on the other hand, were not 1dent1cal.
Lloyds, supra at 214.
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The Court concluded that there was nothing in the Rules
of Civil Procedure or their historical background which
would lend support to the view that it was intended or
purposed that a suit against insurance carriers for the
enforcement of a contractual obligation contained in a
policy of insurance could be joined with an action against
the United States under the Tort Claims Act."

Accordingly,

the Court held that "the motion to dismiss the defendant
insurance companies should have been granted without
prejudice."

Christensen, supra at 448.

The Court in Young, supra in commenting on Rule 20
U.R.C.P. stated that:
First, it will be noted that the rule is
permissive.
Second, it is generally held
that it is not proper to join an action such
as the primary one here, which is based
on negligence, and therefore, in tort, with
one like the claimed supplemental action, which
would be in contract and thus based upon a claim
of an entirely different character.
Young, supra at 848.
This case likewise presents clearly distinguishable
issues. The issues between the plaintiff and defendant are
entirely separate from the issues involved between Mrs. Stagg
and her insurance company.

The trial Court in this action

properly recognized that:
There is only one tort-feasor,
the defendant, and any liability on the
part of State Farm Fire ~ C~s~alty Company
is contingent upon the 11ab1l1ty of the
defendant as provided in the insurance contract
between defendant and State Farm Fire & Casualty
Company and, therefore, the Court finds that the
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plaintiff would not have to joint State Farm
& Casualty Company as a necessary party in order
to proceed with this action even though the
release in question released both the defendant
of her primary liability and State Farm of any
contingent liability.
(R.505).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS A
MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND LAVELL
BROWN AS TO THE NATURE OF THE INJURY SUFFERED BY THE PLAINTIFF,
EUGENE CAMPBELL.
A.

In equity, the Court may only reverse the findings of

fact entered by the lower court if the evidence clearly
Preponderates against such findings.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently ruled on the issue
in Provo City v. Lambert, 574 P.2d 727 (Utah, 1978).

The

Court held that the facts entered by the lower court will
only be disturbed if the evidence clearly preponderates
against those findings.

See also, Boz-Lew Builders v. Smith,

571 P.2d 389 (Mont. 1977).
The Utah Court in Kier v. Condract, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478
P.2d 327 (1970), stated that the Supreme Court will review
the facts in a case in equity, but will do so in light of
the evidence as believed by the trial court and not
necessarily as urged upon it from the point of view of the
appellants.
The trial court in this case found that:
The diagnosis of Dr. Gorishek at the time of the
accident to the effect that any injury to the
neck was slight, not serious, and would be healed
in a month or two, becomes immaterial to the
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questions unless the diagnosis of neck injury
was known to the plaintiff and Mr. Brown at the time
the release was executed. The evidence discloses
the.following facts regarding the plaintiff
dur7ng the crucial period between the time of the
accident and the execution of the release:
som~ discomfo:t in the neck region following the
acci~ent, bruises and swelling in other parts
of his body, a prescription for pain pills and a
com~unication for the doctor on the day of the
accident that his injuries were slight and that
he would be better in a month or two.
He returned to work at his job on a construction
site and continued to work throughout this period.
He visited the doctor 10 days after the accident
with the same symptoms present and the doctor
prescribed a neck collar, more pills and there
was no further communication from the doctor to the
plaintiff relative to the nature of his injuries.
The plaintiff knew that there was something wrong
with his neck, but there is no evidence that
he knew what was the nature of the injury. The
plaintiff contacted Mr. Brown primarily concerned
about getting transportation so he could get back
and forth to work (some 35 miles one way). The
release was signed 12 days after the accident on
September 21st
Mr. Brown appeared at the
meeting where the release was signed with no medical
reports except the statements made to him by the
plaintiff to the effect that there was no serious
injuries.
(Exhibits 23, 24 & 25). He did observe
that plaintiff was wearing a neck collar. The Court,
therefore, finds that there was a mutual mistake
of fact as to the nature of plaintiff's injuries
and that the release was voidable.
(R. 504-5, 526-7).
B.

A release will be set aside when,

at the time of its

execution both parties were laboring under a mutual mistake as
to the existence, nature or extent of the injuries suffered by
the releaser.
The law in Utah as it applies to setting aside a release
of a claim for personal injuries is clearly set out in
Reynolds v. Merril, 23 Utah 2d 155, 460 P.2d 323 (1969),
which was followed and reaffirmed in the recent case of
-26-
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Carter v. Kingsford, 557 P.2d 1005 (Utah, 1976).

The Supreme

Court in overturning the trial court's summary judgment
in Reynolds, supra, which dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint said:
We are not here concerned with the question
of when the plaintiff's disc was herniated.
He has alleged that it resulted from the
accident.
If he can prove it, and that at
the time of.signing the release neither party
knew about it, he should have that privilege.
Reynolds, at 159.
The pivotal question of fact in

a decision to set

aside a release of a claim for personal injuries due to a
mutual mistake regarding the injury to the releaser, is to
"distinguish between an unknown injury and unknown consequences of a known injury."
emphasis).

Reynolds, supra, at 156.

(Original

See, also 71 A.L.R. 2d 82, 105 Section 5(b) and

Later Case Service.

The Utah Courts have firmly adopted the

position that a mutual mistake as to the existence, nature
or extent of an injury will support setting aside a release,
while a mistake as to the consequences of an injury, the
nature and extent of which are known, is simply a mistake of
opinion and are not grounds to set aside a release. Reynolds,
supra at 156, 157.
It is important at the outset to know that the language
of the release is not significant with regard to unknown
injuries. Reynolds, supra favorably quotes following language
from Pirchgestner v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R. Co., 118
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Utah 20, 28-29, 219 P.2d 685, 690,

(1950), (reversed on

other grounds):
The defendant argued that even if the parties
were mutually mistaken with respect to the
nature and extent of the plaintiffs injuries,
such mistake is immaterial because the plaintiff
by the release, discharged all claims and causes
of action which he then had or might thereafter
have or claim on account of any and all personal
injuries whether known or unknown, apparent
or unapparent, including complications arising
from personal injuries, and that the very basics
of the release was that the parties might be
wholly mistaken as to the nature and extent of
the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. However
logical the defendants argument may seem, the
authorities are to the contrary. Because a
release is as all-inclusive in its terms as
legal ingenuity can make it and purports to
release all possible claims arising out of an
accident and is understood as such by the release
for, it will nevertheless be set aside when
it can be shown that at the time of its execution
both parties were laboring under a mutual mistake
as to the extent of the injuries suffered by
the releasor.
(Citations Omitted). Reynolds,
supra at 157.
Further, the Supreme Court favorably quoted from
Ranta v. Rake, 91 Idaho 376, 421 P.2d 747, 751 (1967),
stating that the majority view, which Utah adopts,
• . • permits a releasor to avoid release
where unknown injuries existed at the
time the release was executed though the
release invaribly is broad enough to
encompass unforseen injuries and though
the release was honestly obtained without
fraud, over-reaching or undue influence
on the part of the releasee.
Ranta, supra at 421 P.2d 751.
The issue in the instant case is:

Did plaintiff and

the agent for the defendant's insurer execute the "Agreement
and Release" while laboring under a mutual mistake as to the
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existence, nature or extent of the plaintiffs injuries.
Comparing the facts of the instant case to those of Reynolds,
supra, and of Carter, supra, will assist in the making of
that determination.
In Reynolds, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile
accident and immediately contacted his physician.

Reynolds

was treated for the pains and symptoms which specifically
included pain in his neck.

Reynolds, supra at 155.

Thus,

plaintiff specifically knew his neck had been injured and
had been treated specifically for the injury to his neck for
over three months prior to the signing of the release.
Then, after continuing in increasingly severe pain Reynolds
was finally referred by his personal physician to a specialist
who diagnosed the problem as a herniated disc.
supra at 156.

Reynolds,

A spinal fusion was performed, resulting in

a permanent partial disability.

Reynolds, supra at 156.

The trial court held, essentially, that if Reynolds
knew his neck was injured, and if he was seeing a doctor for
the injury to his neck; and if he knew his condition was not
healed when he signed the release more than three months
after the accident, then he was, therefore, not laboring
under a mistake of fact as to his injuries and the release
was not voidable.

Reynolds, supra at 156, 159.

For these

reasons, the trial court entered summary judgment for the
defendant.

Reynolds, supra at 156.

The supreme Court held that while plaintiff may have
known his neck was injured and not yet healed when he signed
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the release, if he and the agent did not know the true
nature of his injury, i.e., that he had a herniated disc,
there would be a mutual mistake sufficient to set aside the
release.

Reynolds, supra at 159.

The Supreme Court set

aside the summary judgment to give the plaintiff an opportunity to prove that he had a herniated disc, that it was
the result of the accident and that he did not know he had a
herniated disc at the time of the release.

Reynolds, supra

at 159.
The case of Carter v. Kingsford, 557 P.2d 1005 (Utah,
1976), affirmed Reynolds as the law of Utah regarding
releases.
follows:

Carter supra at 1006.

The facts of Carter are as

Mrs. Carter, the plaintiff was involved in a

collision with the defendant.

On the day of the accident

her doctor diagnosed her injuries as "cervical contusions"
or cervical strain, strain of the left shoulder and superficial
abrasions.

Her x-rays at this time showed degenerative disc

disease at C-5/6.

The next day she was hospitalized and

remained hospitalized for five and one-half weeks.

Approxi-

mately three months after the accident, while still under
her doctors care, Mrs. Carter signed a release.

Over four

years after the accident and over three and one-half years
after the release was signed, Mrs. Carter was again hospitalized and a herniated disc was discovered and a fusion performed.
Carter, supra at 1005-1006.
The Court in Carter upheld the plaintiffs release and
indicated that the distinguishing fact between Reynolds and
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Carter was that in Reynolds " • • . the injury was not noted
and not considered in its true light at the time," while in
Carter it was.

Justice Crockett, in his concurring opinion

in Carter, put it this way:
At the time of the settlement [of Carter]
both parties knew that the plaintiff had a
serious injury to the cervical area of her
back.
She had been in the hospital for
over five weeks under medical care with the
use of the hospital diagnostic facilities
including the taking of x-rays.
(emphasis
added).
Carter, supra at 1007.
Justice Crockett specifically noted the fact that "the
x-rays showed 'a slight degenerative disease' of her cervical
vertebra".

Carter, supra at 1008.

The facts of the instant case are fully set forth in
the statement of facts.

But generally, it is undisputed

that Mr. Campbell, was informed by his physician, Dr. Gorishek,
that he had minor injuries - essentially bruises.
18).

(R. 17-

The doctor testified that he thought the condition

would be cured within a month or two and that he had no
reason, at that time, to suspect a herniated disc at the C5, C-6 level.

(R. 18, 59).

The plaintiff left the emergency

room with the impression that he was not seriously hurt. (R.
123).

Accordingly, the plaintiff arranged for substitute

transportation that evening and returned to work the following
day.

(R. 123).
Mr. Campbell telephoned Mr. Lavell Brown, the State

Farm adjuster on September 12, 1973, to make arrangements
-31-
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for transportation during the interim period while he was
without a vehicle.

(R. 125). During that phone conversa-

tion, Mr. Campbell indicated to Mr. Brown that he had
incurred only minor injuries in the accident.
p.3).

(Ex. 23,

Mr. Brown then reported to his superiors that the

injuries received by Mr. Campbell consisted of only "multiple
bruises."

(T. 68, Ex. 24, 25).

Mr. Campbell went to see Dr. Gorishek again on
September 19, 1973.

The doctor noted that his condition

was "still about the same: soreness in the neck, mostly on
the left."

(T. 18).

The doctor stated that he did not

change his diagnosis of cervical strain or have any reason
to suspect any additional injury than that observed on
September 9, 1973, the day of the accident.

(T. 18).

Accordingly, in response to Mr. Campbell's inquiry as to the
seriousness of his injuries, the doctor stated that the
healing "would take a little time, maybe a month or two".
(T.

124).
The doctor summarized his perception at this time by

stating that he knew Mr. Campbell had an injury to his neck,
but at that time, the exact nature of the injury was unknown
to him.

(T. 60 ).

The appellant tries to draw some significance from the
fact that Mr. Campbell continued to experience pain and
discomfort.
these facts.

The respondent fails to see the significance of
Dr. Gorishek had indicated to Mr. Campbell

-32-
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that he could expect to experience one to two months of
discomfort while the cervical strain healed. The fact still
stands that Mr. Campbell had absolutely no understanding
that the continued pain over the one to two months would
mean anything more than the existence and healing of cervical strain.

(See Appellant's Brief, p. 30-31).

Both Mr. Brown and Mr. Campbell indicated that their
settlement was based on the existence of a minor injury that
(T. 101,

would be cured within a relatively short time.

126, 127, 76, 77). The parties did not enter the agreement
on the basis of the non-existence of pain, but in the anticipation that the pain would be alleviated, consistent with
the doctor's diagnosis within one to two months.
These facts clearly fit within the facts of Reynolds
where Reynolds knew his neck was injured in the same manner
but was not disabled and did not consider the injury in its
true light at the time of the release.

156, 159; Carter, supra at 1006.

Reynolds, supra at

The instant facts are

readily distinguishable from Carter, where Mrs. Carter was
aware she had a serious injury to her neck, was hospitalized
for five and one-half weeks immediately after the accident
and was aware of x-rays that indicated problems with her
vertebral disc at c-5/6 where the fusion later took place.
Further, in Carter, a long period of treatment, more
than three and one-half years from the time of the release
expired before the herniated disc developed.

In Carter, the

injury and its serious nature were known, only its prognosis
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was mistaken. In Reynolds and in the instant case, at the
time of the release, there was no indication of any serious
injury and the existence of a herniated disc was unknown and
unappreciated.

The Supreme Court's use of the distinction

to be drawn "between an unknown injury and unknown consequence of a known injury" as delineated in these two cases,
clearly support the lower courts finding of mutual mistake.
For an analogous case, See, Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747
(Idaho 1966).
POINT III
PLAINTIFF DID NOT ENGAGE IN SUCH CONTACT AS 1-'K)UID UNEQUIVOCALLY
INDICATE HIS INTENTION TO RATIFY THE RELEASE AND PLAINTIFF
IS THEREFORE NOT ESTOPPED FROM RESCINDING THE RELEASE.
The test for ratification under both state and federal
law set out in Union Pacific Railroad Co., v. Zimmer, 87
Cal. App. 2d 524, 197 P.2d 363 (1948):
The fundamental test of "ratification•
by conduct is whether releasor with full
knowledge of material facts entitling him
to rescind as engaged in some unequivocal
conduct giving rise to an inference that he
intended his conduct to amount to a
ratification. (emphasis added).
The general principal as stated in 66 Am.Jur. 2d, release
§27 as follows:
A release voidable for any reason may be
ratified and affirmed by the subsequent
acts of the releaser.
Some unequivocal
act must appear giving rise to an inference
that the releasor intended his conduct to
amount to a ratification, or that reasonable
minds would say that by his acts he must
have intended a ratification of release. • • •
(emphasis added).
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The appellant apparently contends that the acceptance of
drafts by Mr. Campbell, and his creditors constituted such
action as would unequivocably indicate an intention, by Mr.
Campbell to ratify the release.

The lower court, when

considering that evidence, stated as follows:
The Court does not feel that acceptance by the
plaintiff of drafts in payment of medical
expens~s and lost wages that approximately the
same time that defendants agent received notice
of plaintiffs intent to void the release.
It is sufficient fact to establish unequivocal
conduct that the plaintiff intended to ratify
or affirm the release. The tender to return
payment and everything transpired thereafter
indicated an intent to void the release and
not to affirm. (R. 505).
The appellant, by claiming that the acceptance of monies
from State Farm after the release was signed constituted
ratification is premised on several fundamental flaws.
First, the release was one which anticipated and
required the payment of future money.
Second, it was not until the fall of 1974 that the true
extent and nature of Mr. Campbell's injuries were known to
him, and it was not until the time of plaintiff's letter of
February 14, 1974, that plaintiff understood that he might
have

right to rescind the release.

The first requisite,

therefore, of the test, i.e., "full knowledge of the material
facts," had not been reached until after the acts pointed to
by the defendant.

Plaintiff then acted with reasonable

dispatch to notify the defendant of his rescision.
Third, the conduct of the defendant, taken as of whole
does not unequivocally indicate the intention to ratify the
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release.

On February 19, 1974, a letter and cashier's check

for $1,250.00 was sent to the defendant specifically rescinding
the release and tendering back the face amount paid for the
release.

This conduct clearly and unequivocally indicated

plaintiffs intention not to ratify the release.
Further, as noted in Watson v. Buggy, 285

s.w.

2d 67,

(Mo. 1955), 53 A.L.R. 2d 743 and Later Case Service, and as
summarized in the annotation itself: "in the majority of
cases a tender back made before the commencement of the
action on the claim release has been held timely, even
though a considerable period of time may have elapsed between
the execution of the release and the offer to return the
consideration received."

53 A.L.R. 2d 743 at 769, Section 3

( 7).

The Court should also take notice of the fact that the
appellant was not subject to any prejudice or induced into
any reliance because of the negotiation of drafts by the
respondent.

The respondent tendered back all monies paid by

the appellant and fulfilled his duty of notifying the releasee
with reasonable dispatch. The facts seem clear that the
plaintiff did not, by unequivocal conduct, affirm or ratify
the release, but on the contrary, conducted himself at all
times in a manner consistent with his notice of rejection,
termination and rescission.

(R. 525).

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ALLOWED INTEREST ON THE
SPECIAL DAMAGES AWARD IN THE INSTANT CASE.
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Utah law as codified in 78-27-44 U.C.A., 1953, allows a
plaintiff who recovers special damages for personal injury
to make further recovery of interest at 8% on said special
damages.

In the instant case, the Court followed the above

cited statute and allowed respondent to recover interest at
8% on the award of special damages.
The specific issue before this Court as to the manner
of applying 78-27-44 U.C.A., 1953, is whether this procedural
matter may be applied retrospectively to allow interest on
claims whose judgments are rendered subsequent to the effective
date of the statute, but whose underlying cause of action
arose prior to the effective date of the statute.

The issue

cannot be generalized so as to be simply a question of
prospective or retrospective application of any statute,
procedural or substantive.
In the instant case, the cause of action arose September
9, 1973, and the judgment upon the claim was rendered March
10, 1978. Respondent contends that the court did make a
correct application of the statute because the judgment was
rendered nearly three years after the May 13, 1975, effective
date of the statute, and because the matter of interest is
clearly procedural, not substantive.
The governing section, 78-27-44, U.C.A. (1953, as
amended), reads as follows:
In all actions brought to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained.by any
person, resulting from or occas1on7d by the
tort of any other person, corporation,
association or partnership, whether by negSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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arises and the Oklahoma state begins at the commencement of
the action.

Neither of these differences has any bearing on

the issue herein.
In Fields, supra, the suit was commenced March 29, 1971,
(the statutory time for the beginning of interest accrual)
but the statute was not approved until June 16, 1971.

A

verdict was returned in July 6, 1973, and the trial court
refused to add interest.
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the
trial court should have added interest to the judgment.

The

court's reasoning was based on the fact that because the
statutory imposition of interest on a judgment is:
Procedural rather than substantive, [itl
directs allowance of interest on judgments
from the time the suit commenced to the
date of the verdict, notwithstanding that
the suit was commenced prior to the effective
date of the legislation.
Fields, supra, at
63.
The Fields case was based on a preceding Oklahoma
Supreme Court decision in Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363
(Okla. 1973).
The court in Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363 (Okla.
1973) answered the question as to the retrospective application of the statute awarding interest on special damage
judgments by stating:
we think that there is retrospective application of the 6% interest matter. That
the le~islature may, in its discretion,
establish interest that will accrue on a
judgment, is, of course, recognized. Sunray
ox Oil Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., supra,
That the "interest" here has the effect of
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damages does not affect the matter. Like
costs, interest is recoverable by statute
(Baldwin v. Collins, (Okl. 1970), 479 P.2d
~67), an? the legislature has so prescribed
it.
It is attached by legislative fiat
(Foster v. Quigley, (1962), 94 R.I. 217,
179 A.2d 494--a retrospective interest case
and here) and is proper.
Not being of the '
substance of the cause of action (Foster v.
Quigley, supra), but being a directive to
the trial court, then it becomes a mode of
procedure which the court was bound to follow.
Since judgments bear interest as prescribed by
12 P.S. 1971, S727, subd. 2. although the
judgments made no provision therefor, and it
being a ministerial duty to award interest~
on a judgment may be corrected by this court
on appeal even though the error was not raised
in the motion for new trial or petition in error.
(Emphasis added).
Benson, supra at 1365.
Other jurisdictions support the above view on the application of interest.
In a case dealing with interest on refunds of tax
franchise payments, the California Supreme Court in
People of the State of California v. Union Oil Company of
California, 310 P.2d 409 (1957), held:
"A statutory interest right for a particular
period depends upon the law in effect at
that time . • • Accordingly, plaintiff
concedes defendant's right to the interest
on over payments for the period prior to July
10 1947, the effective date of the amendme~t."
(See page 412).
(Emphasis added).
For other cases holding similarly see:
Newspapers Inc.,

Ballog v. Knight

(1969), 381 Mich. 527, 164 N.W. 2d 19, M.E.

Trapp Association v. Tankersly 206 Okl. 118, 240 P.2d 1091.
( 1941).
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The above stated rule is based on the theory that a
procedural or ministerial aspect of the law does not induce
parties to rely on it to their detriment.
The substantive laws do induce detrimental reliance by
the public.

This rule has been stated by this Court as

follows:
The rule mentioned is founded on the
theory that since every citizen is
presumed to be acquainted with the law
and to enter into his business transact ions accordingly, it would be unjust
to permit such legislation to operate
retrospectively without a clear statment
of the legislature that such was its purpose.
In Re

Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 148 P.2d 340, 342

( 1944).
An example will illustrate that as a practical and
theoretical matter the procedural-substantive distinction
holds true.
If the substantive law with regard to the standard of
care regarding supervision of school physical activities for
the students were to be changed and applied retrospectively
it would be grossly unfair to schools because they had no
opportunity to escalate their level of supervision to match
the standard of care imposed by law.

The opposite is true

with regard to the procedural application of interest.

The

changing of the law to award interest on judgments will
produce no hardship upon the schools in one example.

If the

schools are meeting their standard of care there will be no
interest imposed because there will be no judgment.
-41-

Interest
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would have to be astronomical in order to cause the school
to fear a judgment against them enough to supervise under
the standard of care.
There is a strong argument that even if the proceduralsubstan ti ve distinction had not been made by the Court, the
statute could still be applied retrospectively on another
ground -that of legislative intent.
The Benson case, supra, formulated the issue in terms
of intent (though they never expounded on this point) saying:
(The) question, then, is whether there is
• • • intent, clearly expressed, or necessarily
implied from the language used that requires
retrospective application of the 6% interest
matter, (at 1365)
and then held that it did apply retrospectively.

The statute

construed in Benson, like the Utah statute construed herein,
allowed interest going back to a time long before judgment
would be rendered, i.e., to the time the cause of action
arose (78-27-44 UCA, 1953) and to the time of commencement
of the action (12

o.s.

1971, § 727) subd. 2). The statutes

did not limit the interest to a time commencing with the
effective date of the statute.
It appears then that the legislature intended the
interest provision to be applied retroactively, otherwise,
the legislature would not have expressly allowed interest
bank to the date the cause of action arose instead of the
effective date of the statute.
The cases cited by appellant inapposite to the issue of
interest on special damages.
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Appellant has cited In Re Ingraham's Estate, supra,
for the proposition that any legislative enactment operates
prospectively only unless expressly declared otherwise.
case does not deal with interest.

The

In Ingraham, supra, however,

this court found that there is a distinction between procedural
and substantive changes in the law and the time for their
applicability.

The court said:

Appellant recognizes this statute and also
the general rule that legislative enactments
operate prospectively rather than retrospectively, unless expressly declared otherwise.
However, appellant urges that the
amendment in question (Sec. 80-12-7 Laws of
Otah 1943) does not come within the bounds of
the general rule stated for the reason that
the amendment is an enactment making only
procedural changes. We are convinced that
the general rule must apply as Sect. 80-12-7,
Laws of Utah 1943, is not a procedural enactment, but is substantive in its effect.
(at 341).
The general rule was applied above only because the
statute was found to be substantive.

Procedural statutes,

as set forth above, may be applied retroactively.
The McCarrey v. Otah State Teachers Retirement Board,
177 P.2d 725 (Otah, 1947) cited by appellant does not deal
with the question of statutorily mandated interest on judgments.
The change of law in McCarrey, supra was with regard to the
definition and computation of years of teaching service for
purposes of retirement and was so clearly substantive that
there was no attempt to make the procedural-substantive
distinction by either the attorneys or the Court.

Hence,

the broad language used by the court.

-43-
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Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d
101, 329 P.2d 398 (1948), cited by appellant does not deal
with the question of statutorily mandated interest on
judgments.

It deals with the substantive law of corporate

powers and ultra vires acts.

It is necessary to point out

again that the case is not good law with regard to a
question not considered, that is, retrospective application
of a procedural statute.
In conclusion, it is important to note that the judge
was duty bound to award interest because the statute in
effect at the time of judgment mandated the imposition of
interest on special damages given in a judgment.

Appellant

cannot be said to have relied on this procedural aspect of
the law and hence there is no equitable reason to eliminate
interest charged to appellant.

More importantly, the law is

clear that there is a distinction between retrospective
application of procedural and substantive law, and interest
is a procedural matter which may be applied retrospectively.
CONCLUSION
The two trial judges who heard this case properly
determined that State Farm Automobile Insurance Company is
not an indispensable party to this action.
The Court determined, upon the clear weight of evidence,
that there was a mutual mistake of fact between Mr. Campbell
and Mr. Brown.

The facts reveal that at the time the release

was executed, the exact nature of the injury was not known

-44-
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to either of the parties.

The plaintiff by his conduct did

not unequivocally ratify the release but, on the contrary,
acted with due diligence to rescind the release agreement
and tender back to the appellant and her insurance company
the money paid under the release.
The trial court decision to allow interest on special
damages was proper in that the statute was procedural and
therefore applicable to the judgment in this case.
Respectfully submitted this

{{fr__ day of October, 1978.
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